PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015)
In what follows, I will briefly introduce the person of Salomo Friedlaender before outlining, in broad strokes, his central thesis. In so doing I will focus on how this important, though much neglected, author may be read as a significant source for contemporary Performance Philosophy and how his key concept, Creative Indifference, may perhaps be drawn on to introduce a different perspective, a middle-way of sorts, in the Mind-the-Gap debate.
Salomo Friedlaender -a very brief biography
Born into a liberal, middle-class Jewish family in 1871 in a small town called Golantsch near the Höch, Else Lasker-Schüler, Martin Buber, Ernst Marcus and Kurt Schwitters, and he became an inspirational reference for the emerging Berlin Dada scene (Lhot 2013, 33-76; Taylor 1990 ).
F/M belonged to the first generation of Nietzschean intellectuals. Georg Simmel personally helped get his book on Nietzsche published in 1911 (Friedlaender/Mynona 2009) . Many of his writings, the satirical tales in particular, but also some journalistic pieces, can be read as bravely outspoken attacks on the darkly looming National Socialist threat after World War I. Eventually driven out of Berlin, F/M fled to Paris in 1933 to escape the Nazis, and it is there, albeit in abject poverty and ill health, that he was to write the largest proportion of his texts, which, due to these adverse circumstances, were slow to be published (and thus even slower to be received). He died in Paris in 1946 at the age of 75. Salomo Friedlaender/Mynona: Performance Philosopher avant la lettre F/M is of great interest from a Performance Philosophy point of view for many reasons and from manifold perspectives. Firstly, and most obviously, is the fact that he was both a serious philosopher (although never conventionally 'academic', and to this day his works remain largely neglected by academic philosophy 2 ) as well as an extremely prolific writer of brilliant -and often PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015) hilarious -satirical narratives otherwise known as grotesques (Grotesken). Moreover, these weren't simply two separate hats that he wore Dr. Jekyll-and-Mr Hyde-like at different times: artist-writer by day, discursive (albeit always playful) philosopher by night; rather, throughout his extensive oeuvre, the two styles of writing, and F/M's two identities, were welded together by his continuous concern to communicate the thought of Creative Indifference. In fact, in performative terms (though long before J. L. Austin's theorisation thereof), F/M was acutely aware of how, at their best perhaps, art and writing do well to embody the content they convey. Thus, the philosophical texts and grotesque tales can be read as polar opposites, which, when read together, demonstrate, i.e.
perform, the theory they contain. (Similarly, Friedlaender's choice of the word Mynona as a pseudonym can clearly be read as a performative embodiment of the notion, explored at length within his theory, that "'I' is but a pseudonym for the eternally anonymous person" [Friedlaender/Mynona 2008, 160 ].
3 )
Self-described as a synthesis between Kant and clown (Haakenson 2009, 137, 144) , without a doubt, F/M was a remarkably eccentric figure, even amongst his most bohemian peers, some of whom referred to him as the "Charlie Chaplin of philosophy" or as the "German Voltaire" (Frambach 2003, 114) . The unique manner in which he merged literature and philosophy would alone suffice for him to qualify as an "artist-philosopher" (treading closely in the footsteps of Nietzsche, his other main philosophical inspiration next to Kant), or indeed as a 'performance philosopher' avant la lettre, but there is much more to his work which is of relevance to the present debate. From this we may deduce that it is the very connecting force at work in much of F/M's thinking and writing, through the notion of Creative Indifference, which seems to be most relevant in helping to create new forms of knowledge and practice. In beginning to explore the concept here, I will therefore focus on highlighting precisely this synergetic power. My hunch is that F/M's conceptual PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015) framework -the very idea of Creative Indifference -presents us with a thought-provoking critical tool which we might, in turn, apply to the particular field of Performance Philosophy in order to draw some conclusions with regard to its own scope and potential.
Polar Differentiation and Creative Indifference
F/M's notion of Creative Indifference is intrinsically bound up with his concept of polar differentiation. The basic principle of polar differentiation may seem straightforward at first, and will certainly sound familiar to anyone brought up academically in the language of (post-) structuralism. The fundamental insight that F/M elaborates and articulates in manifold ways throughout all his writings is this: that "the most general characteristic of any possible phenomenon is the distinction, that is, difference, which can go to extremes" (Friedlaender/Mynona 2009, 98, my translation) . Things acquire meaning by being distinguished from each other in terms of polar opposites. This foundational premise corresponds to a basic law of (linguistic) signification. It is, in many ways, similar to the principle of differentiation -différance -that lies at the heart (or should one say 'margins'?) of Jacques Derrida's later method of deconstruction. There are, in fact, a host of extraordinary analogies to be found between F/M and Derrida. 7 But the motivation and telos of their respective theoretical constructs are arguably different -at least in terms of what they most obviously emphasise. 8 Whilst Derrida's philosophical gesture relies on the recognition of binary opposites in order, first, to underline society's tendency to impose a hierarchy of value between the two elements of a binary structure, and then to question this blind attribution of value and to shake and destabilise its premise (through the method of deconstruction), F/M's recognition of the principle of polar differentiation is in some ways yet more radical. Indeed his purpose is not only (like Derrida's) to emphasise the basic structural equality between distinctive elements connected through polar differentiation (thus implicitly and automatically rendering inoperative any arbitrary prioritisation or hierarchy between them), but also, and above all, to point to the necessary theoretical (and I am tempted to say here diagrammatological) space of connection between them. It is this very space in between, the place of overlap where opposites touch, so to speak, that he suggests has been overlooked and neglected in its significance. F/M's early practice of deconstruction, if you like, (for his writing foreshadows even Heidegger's notion of Destruktion from which Derrida later takes his cue), is to shake the structural foundation of meaning by drawing us into the zone of indifference that necessarily exists alongside any difference, and which must exist, he contends, for structural differentiation to occur. "From time immemorial", he writes, "when dealing with polarities, more attention has been paid to the poles than to their indifference. Yet in this indifference lies the real secret, the creative will, the polarizing one itself, which objectively is absolutely nothing. However, without indifference there would be no world" (Friedlaender/Mynona 2009, 436 , my emphasis).
9
F/M was by no means the inventor of "Creative Indifference" per se, nor was he the first to be interested in the notion of 'indifference' in general, or even the first to think signification in terms of polarity. A full genealogy of the concept would require its reconstruction both in terms of its relation to the traditions of stoicism and scepticism as well as in terms of its position in the works PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015) of Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Schelling (not to mention later in the works of Husserl, Benjamin, Heidegger, Blanchot, Deleuze and Agamben, to name some of the most salient thinkers of indifference). 10 Polar thinking can indeed be shown to constitute something of a leitmotif connecting discoveries in the natural sciences and mathematics (Newton, Galvani, Brugman) with emerging philosophies of nature (Schlegel, Schiller, Goethe) throughout the Romantic period.
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But F/M was surely the first to make it so explicitly his central and most sustained subject of interest, and to do so, as highlighted above, not just in the form of a sophisticated philosophical treatise but also as an artist philosopher / performance philosopher avant la lettre. In what follows I would like to offer some preliminary pointers as to how the idea of Creative Indifference might apply specifically to the field of Performance Philosophy and the Mind-the-Gap debate.
Minding the Gap -of Indifference
Again, without taking the time here to reconstruct any of the proposed arguments on either side of this debate, let me posit for the sake of argument, that 'performance' and 'philosophy' certainly can be, and indeed have often been, made to constitute, in various discursive contexts, polar opposites to each other. That is to say that each has been defined precisely in contrast to the other. Now, according to F/M's discourse of Creative Indifference, polar opposites, however far apart or close to each other they may be, are always connected, always overlap or merge in the space that corresponds to the axial centre of indifference. What is more, this axial centre is not just geometrically speaking intermediary, but it is also and essentially 'creative', F/M tells us, because it is from this space that the very process or advent of differentiation occurs. The reason for this has much to do with F/M's digestion of Kant, and the fundamental recognition that knowledge (i.e.
perception, signification), in order to be such, must stem from a subjective perspective and that the perceiving/knowing subject can never disconnect itself from the content of its perception or knowledge. Stated bluntly and all too quickly: insofar as knowledge exists only in the eye -or mind -of the beholder, that beholder necessarily takes on a performative role in the constitution of that knowledge; it cannot be 'thought out' of the picture. The subject is, therefore, (for Kant as well as for F/M), "heliocentre" of the world. But precisely because F/M positions it at the axial centre of polar differentiation, it is a subject without personal characteristics, for any distinctive characteristic would shift it either side of the void-like centre -making it something as opposed to anything. Of course this "Mann ohne Eigenschaften" (Musil) , this personne without qualities, 12 brings the subject into resonance with a host of other non-characterisable figures that have populated modern theory, from Maurice Blanchot's neutral night (which only the artist philosopher -read again 'performance philosopher' -can bear to address), to Paul Celan's "Niemandsrose", 13 to Giorgio Agamben's "whatever" subject of the future. 14 In F/M's terminology, the subject is ANONYM(ous).
Can this characterless subject, Creative Indifference, that lies at the heart of polar differentiation, be brought into a meaningful encounter with what we have begun to call 'Performance Philosophy', I wonder? What if Performance Philosophy itself were to be positioned at the axial centre, the middle point (also referred to by F/M as the nought or void) between performance and philosophy?
Thinking about it in this way could perhaps offer a further alternative, maybe even a way out of, PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015) the Mind-the-Gap debate, insofar as it would allow us to conceive of a manner in which the two sides can be thought of as both distinct from each other and simultaneously indifferent.
There are, moreover, at least two further advantages of positioning the field of Performance Philosophy in this space of Creative Indifference. First, it provides us with a way of conceptualising (and thus defending perhaps more effectively) the fragile yet nevertheless insistent openness that has been associated with the emerging field of Performance Philosophy from the start. Indeed, conceived of as the place of indifference between 'Performance' and 'Philosophy', Performance Philosophy must not bear (i.e. be reduced or limited to) any particular characteristic; it must be allowed to take on many different (dis)guises and thus be free to move this way or that on the differential axis that distinguishes one 'P' from the other. as how they relate to each other, to our (anonymous) selves and to the world, is still, and always will be, in the making. In other words: Do Mind the Gap, for it is not one.
